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INTRODUCTION
Online activities no longer represent a new or emerging aspect of
the collegiate experience.1 College students are “wired.”2 They are
actively engaged with social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram,
and Twitter; they participate regularly in online gaming activities;
and they own devices like smart phones and tablets that facilitate
their online participation. According to a Pew Research Center
study, the eighteen to twenty-four age group is highly wired, reporting over 80% of four-year undergraduates and graduate students as
3
having social networking sites. Indeed, virtual spaces now constitute
an integral and common aspect of the daily lives of many college stu-

*
**

***
1

2

3

Jeffrey C. Sun, J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Educational Leadership/Higher Education and Affiliated Faculty at the School of Law, University of North Dakota
Neal H. Hutchens, J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Higher Education and Senior Research Associate, Center for the Study of Higher Education, The Pennsylvania State University
James D. Breslin, Ph.D. (candidate), Interim Executive Director, Academic Enhancement, University of Kentucky
Compare Steve Jones, The Internet Goes to College: How Students Are Living in the Future with
INTERNET,
2–4
(Sept.
15,
2002),
Today’s
Technology,
PEW
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2002/PIP_College_Report.pdf.p
df (concluding that college students are early adopters of the Internet, the Internet enhances their education, and their social lives have been changed by the Internet), with
Aaron Smith et al., College Students and Technology, PEW INTERNET (July 19, 2011),
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/College-students-andtechnology/Report.aspx (discussing the use of the Internet among college students).
ANA M. MARTINEZ ALEMAN & KATHERINE LYNK WARTMAN, ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKING
ON CAMPUS: UNDERSTANDING WHAT MATTERS IN STUDENT CULTURE 43–88 (2009); Tiffany A. Pempek et al., College Students’ Social Networking Experiences on Facebook, 30 J. APPLIED
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 227, 227–38 (2009) (analyzing the use of online social networks by college students).
Aaron Smith et al., supra note 2, at 3.
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dents.4 Along with personal online activity not directly connected to
their academic endeavors, students’ participation in online environments extends increasingly to formal instructional contexts, with
5
many courses now taught wholly or partially online. A study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Education reported significant in6
creases in online education. During the 1999–2000 academic year,
only 8% of undergraduate students enrolled in at least one online
7
course. By the 2007–2008 academic year, that percentage rose to
8
20%. Suffice it to say, virtual spaces reflect a dimensional component of higher education. Further, college professors use Internetbased capacities, such as social media, to enhance on-campus instruc9
tion.
Even as student speech and expression have become increasingly
characterized by an online dimension, colleges and the courts are
struggling to “catch up” in terms of the legally permissible limits over
student online speech and expression, both in and out of formal cur10
ricular settings. For colleges, the reverberating quality of online
speech can preserve and magnify harmful and negative attention re-
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Throughout this Article, we use the term “college” to refer to advanced postsecondary
education, and it applies to both college and university.
Jered Borup et al., The Influence of Asynchronous Video Communication on Learner Social Presence: A Narrative Analysis of Four Cases, 34 DISTANCE EDUC. 48 (2013) (assessing the impact
of asynchronous video communication on the learning of different types of students);
Alendra Lyons et al., Video Lecture Format, Student Technological Efficacy, and Social Presence in
Online Courses, 28 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 181 (2012) (assessing the effect of adding
social presence cues to online video lectures); Leyla Zhuhadar et al., The Impact of Social
Multimedia Systems on Cyberlearners, 29 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 378 (2013) (applying
social learning analytics to assess the impact of Social Media Systems on college students
taking online courses).
ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., LEARNING AT A DISTANCE:
UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT IN DISTANCE EDUCATION COURSES AND DEGREE PROGRAMS
4 (2011). In postsecondary education practice, the term “distance education” may include programs delivered in-person but off-site from the main campus. Here, the report
specifically excludes that type of delivery, and it defines “distance education” as “delivered using live, interactive audio or videoconferencing, pre-recorded instructional videos,
webcasts, CD-ROM or DVD, or computer-based systems delivered over the Internet.” Id.
at 2.
Id. at 6.
Id.
MIKE MORAN ET AL., TEACHING, LEARNING, AND SHARING: HOW TODAY’S HIGHER
EDUCATION
FACULTY
USE
SOCIAL
MEDIA
11–14
(2011),
available
at
http://www.babson.edu/Academics/Documents/babson-survey-research-group/teaching-learning-and-sharing.pdf.
Issues with student online speech are certainly not confined to the higher education
realm. Especially at the secondary level, schools and courts have struggled over the appropriate legal standards that should apply to student online speech.
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sulting from online activities.11 For instance, an image posted on Instagram can be passed along, re-imaged, and archived as to continue
the expression beyond what the original messenger may have initially
intended. Further, these social media exchanges may attract attention from individuals outside of campus, the media, and other inter12
The technology has presented challenges for the
ested parties.
courts as well. A legal stumbling block encountered in online speech
cases, taking place in higher education contexts, involves the judiciary’s previous overreliance on legal standards largely derived from
the elementary and secondary education setting in determining college students’ speech rights. Several higher education online speech
cases reveal legal inconsistency and disagreement on the part of
13
courts in terms of which legal framework to use.
In this Article, we explore the challenges facing colleges and the
courts regarding student online speech and other expressive conduct
that emerge within collegiate learning spaces, such as in courses or
student practicums and internships. Our analysis leads us to propose
a refined framework, which we call the “Curricular Nexus Test,” to
14
The proposed
address this inconsistently analyzed area of law.
11

12

13

14

Jack Stripling, Panelists Debate How Far Colleges Should Go to Monitor Online Behavior, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 7, 2011, http://chronicle.com/article/Panelists-Debate-HowFar/126298.
See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON
THE INTERNET 71 (2007); Kashmir Hill, Dear College Students, Please Stop Taking Photos of
(Feb.
6,
2013),
Your
Inappropriately-Themed
Frat
Parties,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/02/06/dear-college-students-please-stoptaking-photos-when-you-hold-inappropriately-themed-frat-parties/.
See, e.g., Feine v. Parkland Coll. Bd. of Trs., No. 09-2246, 2010 WL 1524201, at *11 (C.D.
Ill. Feb. 25, 2010) (holding that a professor did not violate his student’s free speech rights
by disciplining him for posts made to a class message board); Harrell v. S. Or. Univ., No.
08-3037-CL, 2009 WL 3562732 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009), aff’d, 381 F. App’x 731 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that the university did not violate a student’s free speech rights for comments made on an online class message board); Murakowski v. Univ. of Del., 575 F. Supp.
2d 571, 592 (D. Del. 2008) (holding that the university violated a student’s First Amendment rights when it disciplined him for postings he made to a Web site hosted by the
University).
This test is distinguishable from the test put forth in arguments that accept Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), but do not fully contextualize and define
the properties and dimensions of such acceptance. See, e.g., Jessica Golby, Note, The Case
Against Extending Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier’s Public Forum Analysis to the Regulation of University Student Speech, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1263, 1282–85 (2006) (presenting a simplified forum analysis based on distinguishing extracurricular and curricular speech, thus preserving the Hazelwood standard in a seemingly more defined and limited context). At the
same time, our test is largely consistent with concerns about the fit between K–12 speech
and higher education speech cases. See Edward L. Carter et al., Applying Hazelwood to
College Speech: Forum Doctrine and Government Speech in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 S. TEX.
L. REV. 157, 160 (2006) (concluding that, based on an analysis of appellate cases using
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framework applies to cases within one area of college students’ online
speech controversies that have been marked by particular legal confusion, namely, when students engage in independent speech (as opposed to school-sponsored speech) pertaining or connected to a colle15
giate learning space. That is, we focus on instances when college
officials may regulate and restrict students’ independent online
speech on academic grounds. To that end, the Article addresses independent student speech arising from, or in direct relation to, formal instructional contexts as well as speech occurring outside of a
class setting, but still connected with the collegiate learning space.
For speech taking place in a formal instructional context, while believing that colleges need sufficient leeway to regulate the class environment, we contend that colleges should be required to demonstrate a legitimate curricular or pedagogical justification to restrict
independent student speech. While acknowledging that standards
articulated in previous cases, especially Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, are certainly not without application in regards to college
students’ independent in-class speech, we argue that courts should be
more careful in defining what constitutes a legitimate curricular or
pedagogical justification in a college setting versus overreliance on
logic more appropriate for elementary and secondary education contexts. With speech occurring outside of an instructional setting, we
argue that a sufficient curricular nexus should exist in such instances
to subject student speech to institutional authority on academic
grounds.
To situate our discussion in a broader legal context, Part I of the
Article presents three factors that have shaped the way student free
speech cases have been analyzed. These factors introduce leading legal cases and principles concerning free speech and expression that
are generally associated with student speech rights in higher education. The Part also explores problems resulting from courts failing to
differentiate student speech in higher education from that in elementary or secondary education contexts. In Part II, the Article examines legal decisions specifically dealing with online speech to identify the frameworks that have been applied. Building on our
examination of these cases, we propose, in Part III, standards that

15

Hazelwood in the college student speech context, principles from K–12 education cases do
not fit higher education cases). However, this Article builds on prior criticisms and responds to them with a functional approach.
While our Article focuses on college students’ independent online speech, the legal principles and standards we advocate are not confined solely to online speech in many instances.
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provide legal clarification regarding when institutions may restrain or
restrict college students’ independent online speech on academic
grounds, both in and out of class. Finally, in Part IV, the Article
summarizes problems created by failing to distinguish between rights
in higher education and elementary or secondary school. It also recaps the legal standards that we propose to help remedy the practical
problem colleges and courts face in understanding institutional authority to regulate student speech for academically based reasons.
I. FACTORS SHAPING COLLEGE STUDENTS’ SPEECH RIGHTS WITHIN THE
COLLEGIATE LEARNING SPACE
This Part traces the contours and discusses problems that have
arisen in relation to legal standards commonly applied by courts to
college students’ independent speech in what we have termed the
“collegiate learning space.” Three major factors are considered.
First, Subpart A examines over-reliance by courts on the K–12 student
speech cases to construct First Amendment policies that extend to
higher education students. While college students should enjoy
greater degrees of freedom based on age, maturity, and educational
purpose, these cases make few distinctions between the K–12 and
higher education case analyses. Second, Subpart B presents a limiting frame in which these college student speech cases often operate.
Specifically, these cases have used physical location to construct what
falls within the curricular learning space, and such a line of demarcation presents problems for online student speech. Third, Subpart C
illustrates how the differences in factual scenarios in which colleges
and K–12 institutions try to regulate speech regarding curricular matters are not limited to physical location. Taking these three Subparts
together, the problems with analyzing college students’ speech rights
within the collegiate learning space, especially online speech, begin
to unfold.
A. Courts’ Over-reliance on K–12 Student Speech Cases
A complicating factor in untangling the tension between college
students’ independent speech rights and institutional authority over
academic matters rests with the available legal frameworks and analytic approaches. Courts have drawn significantly on K–12 student
speech cases as the bases for the framework for and analytic approach
16
to college student speech cases. In particular, two Supreme Court
16

See discussion infra Parts II.B and III.B.
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cases dealing with secondary students, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
17
18
Community School District and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,
have played significant roles in shaping the legal framework for how
many courts handle public college students’ speech claims.
In Tinker, one of the foundational student speech cases, the Supreme Court denied the authority of high school officials to prohibit
a group of students from wearing armbands as a form of silent protest
19
of American military involvement in Vietnam. The Court stated that
school officials cannot restrict student speech unless it substantially
interferes with the educational environment or impairs the rights of
20
other students. The students’ expressions, via the armbands, neither substantially interfered with the educational environment nor
21
impaired the rights of other students. An important aspect of Tinker
involves reliance by courts on the decision to evaluate student speech
as coming independently from students, rather than deemed as
school-sponsored or taking place in connection with some type of
22
formal instructional undertaking.
While Tinker presented an issue of students’ independent speech,
a subsequent case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, brought forward a challenge involving an instructional environment in the context of a journalism class to introduce a framework for school23
sponsored speech. In Hazelwood, the Court upheld a principal’s authority to censor articles appearing in a student newspaper, produced
24
as part of a journalism course. According to the Court, the Tinker
standards proved inapplicable to the student speech at issue in Hazelwood because the case dealt with speech arising from curricular matters rather than speech sprouting independently from students and
25
not involving an instructional dimension. The Court deemed this
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393 U.S. 503 (1969).
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–10.
Id. at 506 (“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
Id. at 509.
See discussion infra Parts II.B and III.B.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262–63.
Id. at 262–63, 266.
Id. at 270–271. The Hazelwood School Board Policy indicated that “[s]chool sponsored
publications are developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications in regular classroom activities.” Id. at 268. This policy supported the Court’s analysis that the school newspaper fell within a curricular space grounded in educational purposes and not a public forum. Id. at 268–69.
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speech to be school-sponsored speech tied to the curriculum26 and,
setting a new framework, it held that school officials possessed great27
er authority over such school-sponsored speech. In such instances,
held the Court, school officials can limit student expression when
such a restriction is reasonable—that is, when the school acts with a
28
legitimate pedagogical purpose. While the policy argument for this
framework is grounded largely in response to the custodial responsi29
bilities of educators in elementary and secondary schools, importation of the Hazelwood standards to adults in the higher education set30
ting has generated criticism from legal commentators and several

26
27
28
29

30

Id. at 272–73.
Id.
Id. at 273.
See id. at 271 (“Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form of
student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity.”). School administrators may weigh other factors in
decision-making. For instance,
a school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended
audience in determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially
sensitive topics, which might range from the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high school
setting.
Id. at 272. The Court perceived education as a social institution that is responsible for a
child’s development, stating that “the schools would be unduly constrained from fulfilling
their role as ‘a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment,’” if they were not allowed to discipline such speech. Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
See, e.g., Richard M. Goehler, Hosty Is a “Recipe for Confusion and Conflict,” 23 COMM. LAW.
21, 24 (2005) (criticizing a Seventh Circuit opinion applying Hazelwood to college students’ speech); Gregory C. Lisby, Resolving the Hazelwood Conundrum: The First Amendment Rights of College Students in Kincaid v. Gibson and Beyond, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 129, 156
(2002) (predicting “dire consequences” if Hazelwood is applied to college students’
speech); Mark J. Fiore, Comment, Trampling the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The Case Against Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1948, 1950–51, 1965
(2002) (arguing that applying Hazelwood to college students’ speech would reject precedent, close the distinction between college students and secondary school students, and
could curb the tenor of colleges as a “marketplace of ideas”); Karyl Roberts Martin, Note,
Demoted to High School: Are College Students’ Free Speech Rights the Same as Those of High School
Students?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 173, 199 (2003) (arguing that Hazelwood should not be applied
to college students and asserting the use of Tinker’s material and substantial disruption
test); Chris Sanders, Note, Censorship 101: Anti-Hazelwood Laws and the Preservation of Free
Speech at Colleges and Universities, 58 ALA. L. REV. 159, 160 (2006) (advocating for antiHazelwood statutes to protect student free expression in colleges, particularly student publications). But see Christopher N. LaVigne, Note, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier and the University: Why the High School Standard Is Here to Stay, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1191, 1197 (2008)
(suggesting that federal courts will continue to apply Hazelwood to college students’
speech).
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legal opinions.31 Despite these critiques, courts routinely look to the
32
decision in cases involving college students.
B. Importance of Physical Location
In many instances, First Amendment speech protections available
33
to public college students turn upon the context in which the
31

32

33

See, e.g., McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 248 (3d Cir. 2010) (indicating distinctions between speech rights of K–12 students and college students as the basis for not
using the K–12 cases as firm rules in deciding college student speech cases); Kincaid v.
Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (indicating that the Hazelwood
framework was inappropriate for analyzing the rights of college students to express content in a yearbook); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 518 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that the Hazelwood framework is an inappropriate standard for analyzing whether a
student’s Facebook posts are entitled to First Amendment protection from a university’s
disciplinary sanctions).
See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1826 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying Hazelwood to a play performed by college students); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075
(11th Cir. 1991) (holding that restrictions on a college professor’s religious references in
class were permissible). Notably, one case that has generated a significant amount of criticism is the decision of Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
In Hosty II, students on the staff of the state university newspaper printed unflattering
comments about an administrator. Id. at 732–33. When challenged about the accuracy
of certain statements, the student journalist declined to retract any information or print
the administration’s response to the matter. Id. at 733. Soon after, another administrator
required that all subsequent papers be cleared by the administration prior to printing.
Id. The students alleged that the administrators halted the newspaper printing, required
prior approval for future publications, and threatened to suspend the newspaper’s allocation. Hosty v. Governors State Univ., 174 F. Supp. 2d 782, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Among
the claims, the students challenged the university under First Amendment speech rights.
Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to all the defendants except for one, the
dean who halted production and required prior approval before printing. Hosty II, 412
F.3d at 733. On interlocutory appeal, the federal appellate court made clear that Hazelwood was the wrong framework. Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir.
2003). Circuit Judge Terence T. Evans explained that “Hazelwood’s rationale for limiting
the First Amendment rights of high school journalism students is not a good fit for students at colleges or universities.” Id. at 948. He clarified that “[t]he differences between
a college and a high school are far greater than the obvious differences in curriculum
and extracurricular activities. The missions of each are distinct reflecting the unique
needs of students of differing ages and maturity levels.” Id. The Dean filed a petition for
rehearing en banc, and the petition was granted. Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 733. In a 7-4 decision, the majority decided that Hazelwood was the appropriate framework. Id. at 734. In
dicta, the court posed a discussion that weakened the curricular versus extracurricular
distinction, pointing out times when a university may have a publication involving extracurricular activities of students but nonetheless fall outside the public forum sphere. Id.
at 734–35.
At both public and private colleges, standards derived from contract represent a source of
standards relevant to charting students’ First Amendment rights. While courts are often
resistant to depict the student/college relationship as simply contractual in nature, contract standards are routinely looked to in determining the legal rights of students. See,
e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 304 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that one of the
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speech takes place.34 Courts typically afford public colleges greater
legal leeway in placing limits on student speech occurring in formal
instructional contexts, such as the classroom. In contrast, institutional authority often diminishes in relation to student speech taking

34

initial claims asserted in a student’s challenge of the sexual harassment policy included a
state contract claim); Mangla v. Brown Univ., 135 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (recognizing
student handbooks as terms of the contract between the college and student); Goodman
v. President & Trs. of Bowdoin Coll., 135 F. Supp. 2d 40, 55–56 (D. Me. 2001) (offering a
discussion about various courts’ recognition of contractual relationships as a legal source
for students to pursue). Under these standards, institutions must abide by the rules and
standards that have been established to guide student conduct. Such standards are potentially of special relevance at private institutions, where they establish the speech protections available for students. Along with contractual standards, some state courts have
also imposed a common law duty on private colleges to not treat students in a capricious
or arbitrary manner and provided protections analogous to due process protections available to public higher education students. See, e.g., Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F.
Supp. 2d 697, 710 (D. Vt. 2012) (stating that under Vermont law, a private college’s
breach of contract with a student as derived from the terms in the student handbook requires a showing that the “disciplinary action at issue is fundamentally unfair, arbitrary, or
capricious” (internal citation omitted)). At least one state, California, has enacted a law
requiring secular private colleges to provide students with the same First Amendment
rights that are available at public institutions. Yu v. Univ. of La Verne, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d
763, 770–72 (Ct. App. 2011) (discussing California’s Leonard Law, which prohibits private colleges and universities from disciplining students for off-campus speech when that
speech would otherwise be protected under the First Amendment or the state constitution).
While the Hazelwood decision discussed the school’s sponsorship of the newspaper, the
Court emphasized the locus of the speech, namely that the student newspaper was created and edited by students enrolled in a journalism class. 484 U.S. at 271 (“[S]choolsponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school . . . may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum,
whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student
participants and audiences.”). See also Head v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ., 315 F.
App’x 7, 8 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that a state university student failed to state a
First Amendment violation based on the university’s program that required students to
take a “multicultural” course, which he claimed was counter to his conservative positions); Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1285–86 (holding that state university faculty may require
a student to perform a play that includes words the student feels uncomfortable saying as
the program presented justifications that were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a state university student did not have a First Amendment right to submit a nonconforming thesis or to
have a hearing regarding the disapproval of the nonconforming thesis); Salehpour v.
Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 208 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that a state university student
had no protectable protest rights when he failed to comply with the rule barring first-year
dental students from sitting in the last row of the classroom and that college administrators had the authority to discipline him for the violation); O’Neal v. Falcon, 668 F. Supp.
2d 979, 986–87 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (determining that barring a public college student from
presenting on a controversial topic, which might interfere with students’ ability to focus
on speech mechanics rather than the subject matter, presents a legitimate pedagogical
concern).
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place outside of formal instructional situations.35 Apart from special
circumstances, such as speech of a threatening or harassing nature,
student speech, if it occurs outside of a curricular context, generally
receives substantially more constitutional protection than if it occurs
36
in an instructional setting. This distinction proved more easily discernible in a pre-Internet age, as courts could often rely on physical
location (e.g., student speech taking place in a classroom) in helping
to distinguish between instructional and non-instructional settings in
37
evaluating student speech claims. Indeed, this application of “location” is consistent with Hazelwood, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
integrated a forum analysis to determine that the classroom setting
38
did not fall within a public forum. Similarly, other First Amendment cases, outside of the online speech context, have determined
39
that the educational place presents an analytical element.
As shown in several decisions involving online speech, physical location breaks down as a proxy or determinative factor to categorize
independent speech as taking place in an instructional or a non40
As the Court emphasized in Tinker, “First
instructional context.
35

36

37

38
39

40

See, e.g., Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 688 (7th Cir. 2004) (striking down a state university
chancellor’s preclearance policy that banned students and university employees from
contacting prospective student athletes on grounds of infringement of free speech);
Khademi v. S. Orange Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1023, 1034 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (striking down a public college’s student free speech policy on invalid prior restraint and overbreadth grounds). Cf. Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 681 (8th Cir.
1997) (finding that professors and students’ photographic display communicating a political and historical message, located in the public corridor next to the state university’s
classrooms, was protected speech).
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech on Campus, Even Hate Speech, Is a First Amendment
Issue, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 770 (2009) (arguing that a university’s prohibition
of the expression of hate would constitute a content-based restriction that violated the
First Amendment).
Professor Zick suggests a new approach to examine “place” within speech cases, and he
considers cyber-speech, but suggests that it might fall within an existing speech topography he identifies. See Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439, 481–84 (2006) [hereinafter Zick, Space, Place, and Speech]; Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 619 n.252 (2006).
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267–70.
See, e.g., Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that the differences
between high school and university students presents an important analytical distinction);
Smith v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613–14 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (finding
that a college administration could not prevent students from wearing empty holsters in
classrooms as a form of protest, even if they allowed them to do so in designated “free
speech zones”).
See, e.g., Feine v. Parkland Coll. Bd. of Trs., No. 09-2246, 2010 WL 1524201, at *6 (C.D. Ill.
Feb. 25, 2010) (finding that mean-spirited expressions attacking classmates through a
public community college’s online course did not rise to the level of protected speech);
Harrell v. S. Or. Univ., No. 08-3037-CL, 2009 WL 3562732, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009),
aff’d, 381 F. App’x 731 (9th Cir. 2010) (supporting state university’s actions regulating
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Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to teachers and students” and
they do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
41
expression at the schoolhouse gate.” But, the emergence of online
environments has created difficulty for courts in defining where the
schoolhouse gate should begin and end in relation to students’
online expression. Nonetheless, courts have routinely relied on physical location in efforts to define students’ speech rights.
C. Faculty Authority over Curricular Matters
While often playing a lesser and poorly articulated role in relation
to the Hazelwood standards, faculty authority to regulate independent
student speech taking place in an instructional setting or occurring
out of class, but involving a curricular dimension, has been bolstered
by Supreme Court decisions dealing with judicial deference to genu42
ine academic decisions. In Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, the Supreme Court stated that the types of due process requirements often necessary in student disciplinary matters,
such as a formal hearing, are not the same as those required in the
43
Similarly, in Regents of the
context of academic decision-making.
University of Michigan v. Ewing, the Court announced that the judiciary
should “show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment”
when reviewing a truly academic decision and intervene only when an
institution shows a “substantial departure from accepted academic

41
42

43

speech within an online classroom). Cases involving school-aged students, particularly at
the junior high and high school levels, also import the use of “location.” The school law
cases rely much more on Tinker for their legal reach of school authority. See, e.g., D.J.M. v.
Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that a high
school student’s online discussions presented a true threat and were not protected
speech); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that
the school had the authority to discipline a student for cyberbullying). But see Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[U]nder the circumstances, the First Amendment prohibits the school from reaching beyond the schoolyard
to impose what might otherwise be appropriate discipline.”); J.S ex rel. Snyder v. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930–31 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (granting greater
rights to public school students for off-campus speech that enters campus discussions).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (“When judges
are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision . . . they should show
great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment.”); Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of
Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978) (holding that the procedural requirements of an
academic dismissal are not stringent); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328
(2003) (“The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we will defer.”).
435 U.S. at 86.
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norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible
44
did not actually exercise professional judgment.”
Courts have looked to Ewing and Horowitz as secondary sources of
authority along with the primary reliance often given to Hazelwood to
bolster arguments for judicial deference to institutional authority to
regulate higher education student speech with some type of curricu45
lar connection or implicating pedagogical concerns. For instance, a
46
recent decision from the Eleventh Circuit, Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley,
illustrates how the application of Ewing and Horowitz can be relied on
by courts as a justification bolstering institutional authority to regulate student speech with a curricular nexus. In Keeton, the Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the district court in denying a graduate student’s
request for a preliminary injunction to prohibit her dismissal from a
47
counselor education program. The student, Jennifer Keeton, was
dismissed from the program after she refused to complete a remediation program as a condition of participation in the program’s clinical
48
practicum. The faculty imposed the remediation plan requirement
based on Keeton’s comments made in and out of class that demonstrated her unwillingness to abide by relevant professionalism standards for the counselor education program in her future interactions
49
with clients. In reviewing Keeton’s First Amendment speech and religion claims, the Eleventh Circuit looked to the Hazelwood standards
and also relied on the principles articulated in Horowitz and Ewing regarding the need for courts to show deference to academic decision50
making. According to the court, forcing the university to let Keeton
participate in the practicum course threatened to “interfere” with the
51
program’s “control over its curriculum.” In looking to Hazelwood,
however, the court was relying on legal standards for schoolsponsored speech when Keeton’s speech, even though implicating
curricular concerns, was clearly independent student speech.
As a case such as Keeton illustrates, neither the line of cases addressing student speech in public schools nor the line of cases ad44
45

46
47
48
49
50
51

474 U.S. at 225.
See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 732 (6th Cir. 2012) (crafting the decision around a
deferential standard to academic decision-making, though not specifically identifying
Ewing and Horowitz by name); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 962 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining
the deferential standard afforded to the academic environment).
664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 880.
Id. at 868–69.
Id. at 869–70.
Id. at 875–76.
Id. at 875.
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dressing student due process rights in academic grievances have established a clear framework for challenges emerging from independent student speech that potentially implicates legitimate curricular
concerns. As we develop in Part IV, several cases with online facets
have especially served to highlight the limitations of this current approach to defining college students’ speech rights.
II. CONTINUUM OF HIGHER EDUCATION STUDENT SPEECH CASES
As discussed in the previous Part, while often failing to articulate
speech standards specific and appropriate to higher education students, courts have looked to Tinker and Hazelwood and, secondarily, to
Horowitz and Ewing in defining college students’ speech rights in relation to institutional authority based on academic or curricular concerns. Decisions have followed a basic fault line where institutional
authority is typically at a maximum in formal instructional settings
and often diminishes markedly in relation to independent student
52
speech occurring outside of such contexts. While the in-class/outof-class distinction has failed to create a tidy legal boundary and has
increasingly become frayed because of the proliferation of online
53
speech, we loosely follow this general division in organizing our discussion of cases in this Part. First, Subpart A provides an overview of
higher education student speech cases taking place in noninstructional contexts and not characterized as triggering curricular
concerns. Then, Subpart B examines decisions originating in instructional (i.e., class) settings or in some way implicating curricular considerations.
A. Speech Outside of an Instructional Context
Several Supreme Court cases involving public college student
speech outside of a formal instructional setting have dealt with stu52
53

As discussed later, speech that threatens individuals is, however, subject to more intensive
institutional regulation.
See, e.g., Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:09-CV-00205, 2012 WL 1078819, at *6 (W.D.
Ky. Mar. 30, 2012) (holding that a college student had no First Amendment right to blog
about a live birth she witnessed as part of a course on child bearing); see also Yoder v.
Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:09-CV-205-S, 2011 WL 5434279 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 9, 2011) (finding
that an online posting by a college student in state university’s nursing program was not
protected speech when the student described details of the birthing process experienced
from a clinical course); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 2012) (holding that state university sanctions on a student for posts to social networking site did not
violate the student’s free speech rights when the postings violated professional program
rules). These cases are discussed infra Part III.B.
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dents engaged in speech or expression in campus settings generally
open to students or student groups. These cases have crafted judicial
standards expanding college students’ free speech rights following
the Tinker standards and forum analysis.
54
In the formative case of Healy v. James, the Supreme Court, applying the principles articulated in Tinker, declared that First Amend55
The
ment protections apply to public college students’ speech.
Court rejected arguments that a group of students suffered no First
Amendment deprivation when they were denied access to use campus
facilities in the same way as other students because they could still
56
meet off campus. According to the opinion, while the university
could require students to adhere to “reasonable campus rules” to ensure that speech activities did not interfere with the educational opportunities of other students, it could not seek to silence students on
57
the basis of expressing views disfavored by institutional officials.
Just a year later, the Court addressed another set of expressive activities that university officials disfavored. The case, Papish v. Board of
58
Curators of the University of Missouri, also relied on the Tinker analysis.
In that case, a state university expelled a graduate student, calling into question the decency of a political cartoon and choice of words,
when she titled an article “M——f——” (i.e., Motherfucker), which
59
was part of an organization’s name involved in the news story. Upon
60
finding that the expressions were not obscene, the Court concluded
that the university disapproved of the content as the basis for the stu61
dent’s expulsion. Thus, the university violated the student’s constitutional rights when it failed to justify its actions based on reasonable
rules governing conduct in a nondiscriminatory manner, but instead
62
discriminated based on the speech content.
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

61

62

408 U.S. 169 (1972).
Id. at 180–81, 189–91.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 189.
410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (per curiam).
Id. at 667–68.
Id. at 670 (“We think Healy makes it clear that the mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university campus may not be shut off in the
name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’ . . . [I]t is equally clear that neither the political
cartoon nor the headline story involved in this case can be labeled as constitutionally obscene or otherwise unprotected.”).
Id. (“[T]he facts set forth in the opinions below show clearly that petitioner was expelled
because of the disapproved content of the newspaper rather than the time, place, or manner of its distribution.”).
Id. at 671. In one of the dissenting opinions, Justice Burger questioned the conclusion of
the Court that the university could not exercise authority to expel Papish. Id. at 672
(Burger, J. dissenting) (“[I]t is not unreasonable or violative of the Constitution to sub-
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Starting in the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court faced a series of
challenges that addressed the space of the expressive activity. A
63
landmark decision, Widmar v. Vincent, addressed the broad First
Amendment protections generally available to students and student
groups when a public institution creates some type of campus forum
for independent student speech and expression. In the decision, the
Supreme Court held that a university that had made its facilities
available to meetings for student groups could not then deny campus
access to a student organization with a religious purpose absent a
64
compelling governmental interest or as part of a reasonable, content-neutral regulation of the time, place, or manner in which the
65
speech occurred. According to the Court, once the university opted
to create a forum generally open for use by student organizations, it
could not restrict access on content grounds absent a compelling
66
governmental justification.
In Widmar, the Court stated that permitting student organizations
to use university facilities resulted in “a forum generally open for use
by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applica67
68
ble constitutional norms.” Citing Police Department v. Mosley and
Healy, the Supreme Court discussed how it had “recognized that the
campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many
69
of the characteristics of a public forum.” But, the Court also stated
that First Amendment standards should be evaluated “‘in light of the

63

64
65
66
67
68
69

ject to disciplinary action those individuals who distribute publications which are at the
same time obscene and infantile. To preclude a state university or college from regulating the distribution of such obscene materials does not protect the values inherent in the
First Amendment; rather, it demeans those values.”). The university documented
Papish’s academic probation and her provocative actions around campus. Id. at 674–75
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting). While Papish may have been a controversial figure in terms of
academic performance and campus discussions, the per curium opinion noted that the
university’s decision still rested on the content of Papish’s speech. Id. at 670–71 n.6
(“[I]n the absence of any disruption of campus order or interference with the rights of
others, the sole issue was whether a state university could proscribe this form of expression.”).
454 U.S. 263 (1981). Much of the debate in Widmar centered on whether the university
could deny access to the student organization as part of an effort to avoid a potential Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 270.
Id. at 269–270. The Court rejected the university’s arguments that it should be permitted
to deny the student group access to avoid Establishment Clause concerns. Id. at 273.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 267–68.
Id.
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5.
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special characteristics of the school environment.’”70 According to
the Widmar opinion,
A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as
streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission
upon the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example,
that a campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students
and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of
71
its grounds or buildings.

This excerpt suggests that public higher education reflects a substantially different kind of government organization with greater latitude
to impose speech restrictions.
Later Supreme Court cases illuminated the standards applicable
to student forums at public colleges. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi72
tors of the University of Virginia, Board of Regents of the University of Wis73
consin System v. Southworth, and, most recently, in Christian Legal Socie74
ty v. Martinez (CLS), the Court evaluated institutional policies
providing access in terms of campus facilities, funding opportunities,
and organizational membership for officially recognized student
groups as limited public forums, with accompanying requirements of
reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.
In short, the Healy and Papish cases present general institutional
limits to restricting college student speech that is independent in nature and outside of an instructional context, though it occurs within
some type of physical or virtual campus forum. These decisions and
others establish that colleges may limit such speech based on reasonable campus rules and without content-based restrictions. Widmar,
Rosenberger, Southworth, and CLS crafted constitutional standards based
on the expressive space in which the speech takes place. Notably,
when a limited public forum has been established, a college may restrict speech based on reasonable regulations related to the purpose

70
71
72

73
74

Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
Id.
515 U.S. 819 (1995). Potentially instructive for student speech rights in online settings, in
Rosenberger, the Court applied forum standards to a non-physical environment, as a student religious organization sought access to funds available to help support student publications. Id. at 826–27.
529 U.S. 217, 220–221 (2000) (holding that the state university’s viewpoint-neutral application of student activities fees did violate students’ First Amendment rights).
130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010) (finding that the state university’s nondiscrimination policy
requiring all-comers to be eligible members of student groups did not violate free speech
and expressive association rights of registered student organizations).
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of the forum so long as the policy or action is viewpoint-neutral.75 Institutional authority over student speech in campus forums designated for independent student speech is relatively circumscribed when
compared to curricular-based student speech.
B. Student Speech Rights in Instructional Settings or Involving a Curricular
Connection
Unlike the relatively expansive First Amendment speech rights
students often possess in non-instructional situations (absent particular conditions, such as speech that is threatening to specific individuals), courts have generally recognized heightened institutional authority to regulate college student speech arising in class settings or
somehow triggering curricular concerns, such as the enforcement of
76
professionalism standards. The Hazelwood decision has proven especially important in framing the contours of college authority over
77
student speech in instructional settings. As noted, U.S. Supreme
Court cases establishing judicial deference for college and university
decisions made on academic grounds have also served as a basis to
permit enhanced institutional control over student speech in this ar78
ea of cases.
79
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson illustrates college authority in instructional
settings and suggests, as well, some degree of judicial uncertainty re75

76

77

78

79

See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (holding that the university could not place content-based
restrictions on speech in a limited public forum it had created). A limited public forum
is typically a nonpublic forum that the government has identified for purposes of certain
groups or certain topics such as the student groups, facilities, or publications.
See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2012) (observing that schools are given flexibility in determining and enforcing course policies, but denying summary judgment to the school on plaintiff’s claims that it had violated her First Amendment rights);
Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (deferring to the school’s
curricular choices in analyzing a student’s First Amendment claims); see also, Neal H.
Hutchens et al., Testing the Limits of Faculty Authority: Graduate Students Challenge Professionalism Standards as Infringement of First Amendment Rights, 283 EDUC. L. REP. 637 (2012) (discussing Ward and Keeton); Neal H. Hutchens, A Delicate Balance: Faculty Authority to Incorporate Professionalism Standards into the Curriculum Versus College and University Students’ First
Amendment Rights, 270 EDUC. L. REP. 371 (2011) (discussing cases in which courts have assessed First Amendment challenges to school professionalism standards).
See discussions supra Parts I.A and I.C. The standards have also been applied to legal disputes involving institutional authority to regulate professorial speech. See, e.g., Bishop v.
Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a college course was not a
public forum).
In the context of legal deference to academic decisions, lower courts have also looked to
Horowitz and Ewing in deciding student speech cases. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,
356 F.3d 1277, 1292 n.14 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d. 939, 950–51 (9th Cir.
2002).
356 F.3d at 1277.
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garding an appropriate standard for student’s academic speech. The
case centered on a student enrolled in a theater program at the University of Utah. The student argued that the First Amendment protected her from not having to express words she found offensive in
80
In reviewing the student’s legal
fulfilling course assignments.
claims, the Tenth Circuit described the classroom as a “nonpublic forum” subject to reasonable regulations by officials on student
81
speech. The opinion divided student speech in educational settings
into the two areas of independent “student speech that ‘happens to
82
occur on the school premises’” and “‘school-sponsored speech,’
which is “speech that a school ‘affirmatively . . . promotes’ as opposed
83
to speech that it ‘tolerates,’” which is governed by Hazelwood.” While
acknowledging disagreement among courts over applying Hazelwood
to non-curricular student speech, the court stated that the standards
from the decision applied to the current case because it dealt with
84
curricular speech.
Brown v. Li, one of the cases relied on by the court in Axson-Flynn,
highlights disagreement over the appropriate legal standards to govern independent student speech implicating some type of academic
85
or curricular concern. This decision involved a graduate student
who satisfied all degree requirements, but his committee withdrew its
approval of his thesis after becoming aware that the student had included a “Disacknowledgements” section in the document originally
86
approved by the committee. In the “‘Disacknowledgements’” section, the student stated that he “would like to offer special Fuck You’s
to the following degenerates for . . . being an ever-present hindrance
87
during my graduate career.” The student included elected officials,
university employees, and academic departments among the targets
88
of his comments. After being informed about the inclusion of the
80

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. at 1280. The student opted to withdraw from the university after the theater department informed her that she would receive no exemption from being able to speak words
that she found offensive in fulfilling course assignments. Id. at 1282. For support, the
court looked to Settle v. Dickson County School Board, 53 F.3d 152, 155–56 (6th Cir. 1995),
where the court relied on the Hazelwood framework to hold that a secondary school
teacher, in the exercise of a legitimate pedagogical aim, could prohibit a student from
writing an essay solely on Christianity or the life of Jesus.
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1285.
Id. (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2002)).
Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988)).
Id. at 1286 n.6.
308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 942.
Id. at 943.
Id.
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material, the student’s thesis committee determined that the
“Disacknowldegements” section failed to satisfy commonly accepted
professional standards related to the inclusion of an acknowledg89
ments section in a thesis. The university eventually decided that it
would award the student his degree based on the thesis originally approved without the offending section, but the student declined to
submit the thesis without the “Disacknowledgements” page as the of90
ficial version to the university library.
A panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, while
agreeing to remand the case for consideration of a state constitutional claim, could not reach a consensus regarding the legal standards to
guide analysis of the student’s First Amendment arguments. The
opinion announcing the court’s judgment asserted that the Hazelwood
91
standards sufficed in providing the appropriate legal framework,
even though the authoring judge acknowledged that no Supreme
Court decision had specifically addressed “the appropriate standard
for reviewing a university’s regulation of students’ curricular speech”
and it represented “an open question whether Hazelwood articulates
the standard for reviewing a university’s assessment of a student’s ac92
ademic work.” Despite this lack of guidance from the Supreme
Court, the judge stated that the Hazelwood standards still should apply
to a higher education environment, with academic freedom considerations supporting greater regulation of college students’ speech
than would ostensibly be permissible for elementary and secondary
93
students. According to the opinion, the committee acted in accordance with a legitimate pedagogical purpose in refusing to approve the
94
thesis.
95
One of the judges on the panel argued against applying the Hazelwood standards to higher education students, stating that “the reasons underlying the deference with respect to the regulation of the
89
90
91
92
93

94
95

Id. at 943.
Id. at 945. Submitting the approved version to the library constituted a requirement for
fulfilling degree requirements.
Id. at 949.
Id.
Id. at 951. The court acknowledged that faculty have academic freedom and autonomy to
make decisions regarding teaching, but it found the Hazelwood case as the controlling
framework to evaluate questions of curricular speech. According to the court, the Hazelwood framework, unlike an academic freedom justification, “does not immunize the university altogether from First Amendment challenges but, at the same time, appropriately
defers to the university’s expertise in defining academic standards and teaching students
to meet them.” Id. at 952.
Id.
Id. at 957 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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speech rights of high school youths do not apply in the adult world of
college and graduate students, an arena in which academic freedom
96
and vigorous debate are supposed to flourish.” Instead, standards
regulating the limited or designated public forum or associated with
intermediate scrutiny represented better alternatives to evaluate re97
strictions on college students’ curricular-based speech. Accordingly,
while agreeing with the decision to remand the case to examine the
state constitutional issues, the judge rejected the Hazelwood framework as the appropriate analysis for higher education contexts.
Despite continued periodic questioning of reliance on Hazelwood
to evaluate student speech claims in higher education, as demonstrated by several lower federal court rulings, the decision continues
to play a prominent role in higher education cases with a curricular
98
99
dimension. In O’Neal v. Falcon, for instance, a community college
student claimed that an instructor violated her First Amendment
rights in refusing to let her select abortion as topic for an in-class
100
The court, looking to Brown and Axson-Flynn,
speech assignment.
determined that the “Hazelwood framework” should guide its analy101
The court refused to apply the Tinker standards because the
sis.
102
The
student’s speech took place as part of a course assignment.
court stated that Hazelwood did not require it to balance the student’s
speech rights against the college’s educational purpose in disallowing
the speech; instead, the inquiry focused on whether a valid educa103
tional purpose motivated the institution’s actions. Additionally, the
allowance of other controversial topics for discussion in class assignments did not invalidate the school’s ability to prohibit the speech
topic.

96

97
98

99

100
101
102
103

Id. Another concurrence argued that the student’s act of deceit in hiding the
“Disacknowledgements” section from the committee should bar the student from being
able to assert a cognizable First Amendment claim. Id. at 956 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
Id. at 963–64.
Courts have not limited the decision’s reach to cases involving students. In Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991), for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit looked to Hazelwood in rejecting a faculty member’s First Amendment
arguments.
668 F. Supp. 2d 979 (W.D. Tex. 2009). The school also obtained a temporary restraining
order against the student for potentially threatening language communicated by the student in legal documents related to the case. Id. at 985 n.2.
Id. at 982.
Id. at 985.
Id. at 987.
Id. at 986 (citing Curry ex rel. Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d 570, 579 (6th Cir. 2008)).
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A federal district court case, Heenan v. Rhodes,104 which involved a
nursing student, provides an instructive example of a court struggling
with application of the Hazelwood standards to student speech failing
to qualify as school-sponsored. In Heenan, a student claimed that her
dismissal from a nursing program occurred because she challenged
the academic program’s disciplinary policy, which was based on a
105
points system. In the case, the court issued an amended opinion to
clarify several problematic legal stances it had seemingly taken in regards to the legal standards appropriate to evaluate the student’s
speech claims.
In its initial opinion, the court declined to apply the Tinker standards, even though the student’s speech did not deal with satisfactory
completion of course requirements, and at least some of the speech
referenced by the court clearly took place outside of a class environ106
ment. According to the opinion, the Tinker standards only should
107
apply to politically based speech. In contrast, stated the court, the
nursing student’s speech was non-political in nature and dealt only
with complaints aimed at the school’s internal grading and discipli108
nary policies.
As such, determined the court in its first opinion, the Hazelwood
standards governed the student’s speech claims rather than those
109
from Tinker. In making the distinction between student speech that
reflected a political versus non-political message, the court acknowl110
edged that the case did not involve school-sponsored speech. But,
looking heavily to Brown v. Li, the court stated that Hazelwood “has
been adopted by other courts faced with the question of what protections are due student expression that touches upon internal school
111
matters of pedagogical and curricular concern.” That is, the court
appeared to suggest that even in relation to any of the student’s
speech taking place outside of an instructional context, the Hazelwood
standards should apply merely because the content of the speech ad-

104

105
106
107
108

109
110
111

757 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (M.D. Ala. 2010). The student moved to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied by a later court. Heenan v. Rhodes, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1320
(M.D. Ala. 2011).
Heenan, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
Id. at 1236–38.
Id. at 1237.
The court looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393
(2007), to support the position that the nature of the speech at issue in Tinker raised special First Amendment concerns.
Heenan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 1237–38.
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1238.
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dressed pedagogical and curricular issues related to the nursing pro112
gram.
113
In a second opinion, while refusing to rescind the grant of
summary judgment against the student, the court offered some important clarifications. The court emphasized that the student’s dismissal was proper because it was based on documented poor academ114
The amended opinion also stated that Hazelwood
ic performance.
did not sanction institutional authority to take punitive action against
115
a student for out-of-class speech that was not made to instructors.
The court discussed how Hazelwood could extend to comments made
concerning the nursing standards “expressed in nurse-training related circumstances” as well as perhaps made to instructors outside of
116
Notably, even in its revised opinion, the
an instructional setting.
court indicated that the Hazelwood standards could still apply to a student’s independent, in-class speech critical of instructional methods
or assessment criteria simply based on the fact that it took place in
117
In doing so, the opinion failed to offer any meaningful disclass.
tinctions regarding when a student should be able to, for instance,
disagree with grading or pedagogical practices, including during
class, without foregoing First Amendment protection.
The Heenan decision reveals a court struggling with the extent to
which the Hazelwood standards should apply to college students’ independent speech, either taking place in an instructional setting or
occurring outside of an instructional context, but potentially implicating curricular matters. In attempting to remove some of the student’s speech from the purview of Tinker, the court failed to announce a very convincing legal rationale as to why the decision only
118
The
applied to independent student speech of a political nature.
amended opinion in Heenan, despite offering some clarification, also
112

113
114
115
116
117
118

The court found that the college did not violate Heenan’s First Amendment rights as the
complaints did not rise to the level of protected speech. The court rationalized that in
“fulfillment of their duties as educators, the defendants [were] tasked with inculcating
the necessary knowledge, values, and experience, so that their nursing students can become valued and reliable members of the medical community upon graduation.” Id. at
1239. While the decision thus drew on concepts from cases articulating deferential
treatment to colleges and their faculties when evaluating academic performance, the
court relied on Hazelwood as the legal standard to determine that the nursing program’s
point system was “clearly ‘reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’” Id.
Heenan v. Rhodes, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2011).
Id. at 1320–21.
Id. at 1321.
Id.
Id.
Heenan v. Rhodes, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1236–38 (M.D. Ala. 2010).
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failed to articulate a sound basis for when independent student
speech having some potential curricular connection should be sub119
ject to faculty authority. In sum, the case illustrates problems with
wholesale importation of the Hazelwood standards to college students’
speech, especially when the speech at issue clearly falls outside the
120
conceptual umbrella of being school-sponsored in nature.
Hazelwood appears to provide a reasonable legal framework appropriate for higher education when dealing most directly with student speech pursuant to fulfilling curricular requirements, such as in
121
Axson-Flynn. In such instances, institutional authority over the student’s speech is grounded in faculty expertise to make curricular and
pedagogical choices clearly tied to student performance and to the
overall learning environment for other students. A case like Heenan,
in contrast, shows the Hazelwood school-sponsored speech concept being stretched too thin. Similarly, issues confronted in several of the
online speech cases, discussed in the next Part, have also revealed the
need to move away from or modify the Hazelwood standards in relation to independent student speech occurring in an instructional
context or raising curricular concerns.
C. Student Independent and Curricular Speech Distinctions
The line of cases analyzed between Subparts A and B raises three
significant points in the application of student speech outside and inside of instructional contexts.
First, these cases illustrate that the reasonableness standard operates based on different assumptions. Student speech outside of an
instructional setting is afforded greater degrees of freedom with reasonableness interpreted more narrowly, whereas courts have viewed
reasonableness more broadly in regards to student speech within the
curricular learning space. The Heenan case illustrates such a definitional stretch of the reasonable application in curricular matters, one
well beyond the seeming confines of Hazelwood.
Second, these cases illustrate that the Supreme Court has established quite clearly that forum is not a location-based criterion. The
Court has taken the forum analysis to include spatial forums in terms

119
120

121

See id. at 1236–38; Heenan, 761 F. Supp. 2d at 1320–21.
The conflicts regarding the applicable standards present quite evidently the arguments
pertaining to the over-reliance on K–12 cases—particularly Hazelwood, Tinker, and the cases addressing faculty authority over curricular matters, such as Horowitz and Ewing. See
discussions supra Parts I.A and I.C.
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1287 (10th Cir. 2004).
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of access to what Professor Zick would characterize as an “expressive
122
topography.” Thus, physical location need not serve as such a strict
marker to address what falls within the collegiate learning space. Because online speech adds new spatial challenges, the notion of curricular learning space may require re-conceptualization of location in
terms of where the speech was initiated (i.e., origination of the posting), mediated (i.e., the facilitated transmission), and touched (i.e.,
the impacted campus area).
Third, student speech cases—e.g., Widmar, Rosenberger, Southworth,
and CLS—establish that public higher education institutions must not
favor or discriminate against particular student views in the regulation of forums that are open to students. This analysis is more restrictive regarding viewpoint neutrality than when courts typically employ
123
the Hazelwood framework. That is, viewpoint neutrality for students’
independent speech under the limited public forum standards followed
in Widmar, Rosenberger, Southworth, and CLS examine if a public college’s actions foreclose access, while viewpoint neutrality in relation
to students’ curricular-based speech grants public colleges the authority to foreclose access in a uniformly viewpoint neutral manner.
III. STUDENT ONLINE SPEECH CASES IN AN INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING
OR WITH A CURRICULAR CONNECTION
A review of legal decisions involving online student speech shows
that courts have tended to follow the general distinctions discussed in
Part II between speech taking place in curricular contexts versus in
non-curricular settings. At the same time, the cases demonstrate that
no definitive framework reflects the appropriate legal analysis for independent student speech taking place outside of an instructional
setting but involving some type of curricular connection, such as the
124
enforcement of professionalism standards. A review of these cases
122

123

124

See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 37, at 125. Thus, the cases are consistent with
the view that greater distinctions are needed and that the expressive topography presents
a viable analysis to delineate the “space” among these different speech settings.
Even within these cases, there is a slight distinction. When a case involves the exclusion
of certain classes of speakers or topics from the limited public forum, the restriction must
be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. By contrast, if the regulation excluded certain classes of speakers or expressive matters of individuals or groups who achieved access to the
limited public forum, the analysis would have followed a strict scrutiny review. That is,
the restriction must be content neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez (CLS), 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985–86
(2010).
See, e.g., Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 2012 WL 1078819, No. 3:09-CV-0025, at *7 (W.D. Ky.
Mar. 30, 2012) (finding that the nursing program had a legitimate pedagogical purpose
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serves to magnify the shortcomings of over-reliance on legal standards derived from cases at the elementary and secondary level to
higher education student speech claims. Additionally, several decisions involving independent student speech claims in the context of
practicums or internships show courts turning to the public employee
125
speech cases in defining student speech rights. Just as over-reliance
on legal decisions involving elementary and secondary students is
misplaced in defining student speech rights in a higher education
126
setting, looking to the public employee speech standards also often
strikes a poor legal balance between college students’ speech rights
and faculty authority.
A. Online Speech Cases in an Instructional Setting
Several online speech cases have dealt with class-related expression of college students, where courts followed the pattern established in previous decisions involving physical classrooms of deference to academic authority and reliance on the Hazelwood standards.
127
One such case, Harrell v. Southern Oregon University, dealt with a student, Peter Harrell, challenging action taken against him for online
128
The federal district
postings made in two classes taught online.
court, adopting the report and recommendations of a magistrate
judge, held that the institution acted appropriately in sanctioning the
129
University officials disciplined Harrell for making online
student.
postings in two courses that were determined to be disrespectful to
130
students and to instructors. The student’s postings in the first class
resulted in a formal censure, and his problematic online postings in
131
the second course resulted in probation. Illustrative of the type of
comments made, in one class posting Harrell stated to another student that “‘clearly you haven’t bothered to read the rest of the board

125
126
127
128
129
130
131

to hold a student responsible for posting on a social media site about a patient’s birthing
process); Byrnes v. Johnson Cnty. Cmty. Coll., No. 10-2690-EFM-DJW, 2011 WL 166715, at
*2 (D. Kan. 2011) (using none of the traditional frameworks in student speech cases to
resolve this case, but recognizing less deference to the college for the discipline of nursing students for having posted photos examining a placenta specimen); Tatro v. Univ. of
Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 524 (Minn. 2012) (finding that the violation of academic program rules was sufficient to discipline a student).
See, e.g., Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007); Snyder v. Millersville, No.
07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
See discussion supra Part I.A.
Harrell v. S. Or. Univ., No. 08-3037-CL, 2009 WL 3562732 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009).
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
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[postings] on this topic.’”132 For this and other instances of speech
deemed disrespectful to other students, Harrell was disciplined under
the university’s student conduct standards, which contained a provision that prohibited students from disrupting, obstructing, or inter133
fering with “‘educational activities.’”
In reviewing the student’s claims, the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendations discussed both Tinker and Hazelwood in relation to student speech rights, with the court noting that the latter decision sanctioned the regulation of student speech considered school134
sponsored. Looking to the Hazelwood standards, the court rejected
Harrell’s argument that the school’s policy failed on vagueness or
overbreadth grounds and also rejected the student’s challenge to the
135
policy as applied to him. In making these arguments, Harrell relied
on previous decisions where courts had struck down general antiharassment rules adopted by colleges or universities that had applied
136
The magistrate
to speech or activity outside of the classroom.
judge, rejecting these efforts, concluded that the school’s policy permissibly sought to regulate conduct that interfered with or obstructed
educational activities, rather than seeking to target students on the
137
In relation to the as applied chalbasis of particular viewpoints.
lenge, the magistrate report and recommendations stated,
Plaintiff argues that because his objectionable speech is connected in
some way, even tangentially, to his personal political convictions, he is
entitled to express himself in any way he chooses. It is possible, however,
for Plaintiff to express his political views without insulting other students. . . . His comments did not express his political opinions, as he asserts. The comments belittle other students’ work and their contribution
138
to the discussion.

While the federal district court acknowledged that the institution’s policy could have been clearer, it supported the magistrate
judge’s determination that college officials acted well within their authority to restrict Harrell’s speech. According to the court, it appeared that he had “behaved in a manner that would be tolerated in
few classrooms. Harrell perceives class discussion as a form of ‘com139
Discussing the special
bat’ and he conducts himself accordingly.”

132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id.
Id. at *3 n.1.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6–9.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *1.
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institutional prerogatives existing in relation to the class environment, the federal district court stated
A classroom is not a public forum where each student has an absolute
constitutional right to say whatever he pleases, when he pleases, however
he pleases, for as long and as often as he pleases. This is not talk radio.
Most of the precedents Harrell cites involve speech occurring on campus
or otherwise having some connection to a school, but not during actual
140
classes.

Another case, Feine v. Parkland College141 resulted in a similar outcome to Harrell, with the court in fact looking to that decision for
142
The case dealt with a student, Feine, who made several
support.
online comments that a course instructor determined to be inappropriate and warned the student to modify his future online postings
143
directed at other students enrolled in the course. The instructor’s
syllabus contained language that warned students against making
“‘inappropriate postings (for example: personal attacks, prejudiced
144
In addition
language, incoherent ramblings, proselytizing, etc.).’”
to warnings from the instructor, a student who was the target of some
of Feine’s online comments initiated a harassment complaint against
145
Based on
him that alleged gender and disability discrimination.
Feine’s online posts, the professor deducted points from an assignment and also warned him that future incidents would result in disci146
plinary actions. Feine initiated legal action after he unsuccessfully
lodged an administrative complaint against the instructor, claiming
147
deprivation of his First Amendment speech rights.
In considering the student’s claims, as in Harrell, the court determined that the institution did not discipline the student for the content of his speech but, rather, for the student’s “manner of writing
148
and his personal attacks on the postings of another student.” While
pointing out that views and content are generally protected by the
First Amendment, the court emphasized that the actions taken
against Feine were based on legitimate pedagogical concerns related
to his “manner of expression and not the content of his messages or his
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id.
Feine v. Parkland Coll. Bd. of Trs., No. 09-2246, 2010 WL 1524201 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 25,
2010).
Id. at *6. The opinion does not provide specific details or examples regarding the nature
of the student’s online comments.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *6.
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viewpoints regarding the subject matter of the course assignment.”149
As such, stated the court, the student could not rely on the First
150
Amendment to protect his abusive treatment of other students.
The court, directly addressing the online nature of the speech at issue, stated that precedent in the Seventh Circuit had established that
151
According to the opinion,
classrooms are not public forums.
“[u]nder the circumstances alleged here, the fact that classroom discussion was conducted via an electronic discussion board and email
messages does not change the essential nonpublic nature of the class152
room.”
Cases such as Harrell and Feine indicate that courts are likely to
show little hesitation in extending faculty authority recognized over
student speech taking place in a physical classroom to the context of
online course environments. Just as with a physical classroom, courts
are likely to give considerable latitude to institutions in imposing
viewpoint neutral regulations to online settings when that speech impinges on the learning environment of other students. As the next
Subpart shows, more difficult legal questions have arisen in relation
to online student speech not arising directly in a class context, but
still potentially implicating a sufficient curricular or instructional
concern to permit regulation of the student’s speech on academic
grounds.
B. Cases Outside of an Instructional Setting but Implicating Curricular
Concerns
In several cases, courts have considered institutional authority
over student online speech occurring outside of a formal instructional context but raising curricular concerns, such as the application of
professionalism standards in internships and practicums. One of
153
these cases, Yoder v. University of Louisville, involved a student, Nina
149
150
151

152
153

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2001)).
The opinion also discussed Pichelmann v. Madsen, 31 F. App’x 322, 327 (7th Cir. 2002),
where the court determined that a university e-mail system did not constitute an open forum.
Feine, 2010 WL 1524201, at *7.
Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:09-CV-205-S, 2009 WL 2406235 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 3, 2009).
On remand, the district court declined to rule that Yoder’s action was moot because she
had graduated from the university’s nursing program during the litigation. Yoder v.
Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:09CV–205–S, 2011 WL 5434279 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 9, 2011). Thus,
this case may still result in a review of Yoder’s claims on First Amendment and due process grounds.
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Yoder, who was dismissed from a nursing program at a public university based on online postings appearing on her personal page on the
154
Yoder made online comments
social networking site Myspace.
about an obstetric patient that she observed during the birthing pro155
cess as part of fulfilling the requirements of a child-birthing class.
She wrote, for instance, “‘Beautiful pregnant women are beautiful, or
more like, only slightly distorted with the belly . . . . Otherwise, pregnancy makes an ok-looking woman ugly, and an ugly woman— fuck156
ing horrifying.’” Another comment stated, “At last my girl gave one
big push, and immediately out came a wrinkly bluish creature, all Picasso-like and weird, ugly as hell, covered in god knows what, screech157
ing and waving its tentacles in the air.”
After the course’s instructor learned of the posting from another
student, she determined that Yoder had violated the school of nursing’s honor code, the course’s confidentiality agreement, the terms
of the consent form signed by the mother, and the general standards
158
of the nursing profession. The honor code provided, in part, that
students agreed “to adhere to the highest standards of honesty, integrity, accountability, confidentiality, and professionalism, in all written
work, spoken words, actions and interactions with patients, families,
159
The confidentiality agreement provided that
peers and faculty.”
students would “consider confidential any and all information entrusted” to them during clinical rotations, with such information encompassing “medical, financial, personal, and employment related
160
information.” Yoder also agreed to respect the terms of the consent
form signed by the patient, which stipulated that “[a]ny information
shared with the named nursing student will be used only for written/oral assignments. . . . I understand that information regarding
my pregnancy and my health care will be presented in written or oral
161
form to the student’s instructor only.”
The instructor brought the blog comments to the attention of
administrators, and Yoder was dismissed from the nursing program
162
after she admitted to making the blog post. Yoder challenged her
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Yoder, 2009 WL 2406235, at *1.
Id.
Id. (noting that the postings did not offer identifying information regarding the women
observed by the student).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. Yoder also agreed to respect the terms of the consent form signed by the patient.
Id.
Id. at *4.
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dismissal on First Amendment and due process grounds.163 The district court initially ruled in Yoder’s favor, but on contractual grounds
164
instead of on the basis of the First Amendment. Following remand
from the court of appeals on the basis that the contractual issue had
not been properly raised for consideration, the federal district court
165
The court determined that
upheld the nursing school’s actions.
requiring Yoder to adhere to the terms of the confidentiality agree166
According to the
ment served a legitimate pedagogical purpose.
court,
[I]n exchange for the opportunity to follow the birth mother, Yoder
agreed not to publicly disclose any information about the birth-mother’s
pregnancy or health care. And . . . [the school of nursing] had a legitimate pedagogical purpose in requiring that its students agree to that
167
condition with the patients they were to follow.

Yoder also attempted to argue that other students had not been disciplined in a similar fashion for their “coarse” or “unprofessional”
168
online speech. The court accepted the explanation of program officials that these students had not been subject to discipline because
169
In its decision,
their comments did not refer to specific patients.
the court discussed that deference to academic judgment is “particu170
The
larly acute in the case of schools in the health care field.”
court also held that the dismissal of Yoder complied with due process
requirements, determining that she was dismissed for academic rea171
sons versus disciplinary ones. As such, stated the court, the “fairly
172
minimal” process provided to Yoder was adequate.
While vacated for improperly considering the student’s claims on
173
contractual grounds, the initial district court opinion in Yoder pre-

163
164
165

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at *1, *4.
Id. at *5.
Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 417 F. App’x. 529, 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (vacating a previous
order granting Yoder’s motion for summary judgment); Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, No.
3:09-CV-0025, 2012 WL 1078819 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2012) (denying Yoder’s motion for
summary judgment). In the most recent turn in this litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that university officials named in the lawsuit were entitled to
qualified immunity from liability, as any First Amendment right asserted by Yoder in relation to her blog posts was not clearly established. Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 125354, 2013 WL 1976515, at *6–8 (6th Cir. May 15, 2013).
Yoder, 2012 WL 1078819, at *6–7.
Id. at *8
Id.
Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *9.
Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 417 F. App’x 529, 530 (6th Cir. 2011).
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sents an interesting contrast with the district court’s later opinion,
highlighting the inconsistencies that often surround the student
speech cases. Namely, in the initial opinion, the district court gave
much less deference to the academic authority of the nursing program faculty regarding the interpretation of the professionalism
standards at issue. The court stated in the first opinion that the applicable standards governing the student’s conduct and speech activities referred to the disclosure of identifying information and not to
the disclosure of details involving specific, but unidentified (i.e.,
174
anonymous) patients.
The court in this initial opinion also stated that professionalism
was not adequately defined in the nursing school’s rules and regula175
tions. The university argued that beyond any confidentiality issues,
the posting violated professionalism standards because of its “vulgar
176
and unprofessional manner.” The court drew a distinction between
communications in the context of Yoder carrying out her responsibilities as a nursing student versus her engaging in expression outside of
a professional context:
The court does not disagree with Defendants that the Blog Post is vulgar.
It is generally distasteful and, in parts, objectively offensive. However, the
Blog Post is not “unprofessional.” Rather, it is entirely nonprofessional,
and therefore it falls outside the purview of the Honor Code. Yoder did
not post the Blog “as a representative of the School of Nursing.” Moreover, the Blog Post is not “written work, spoken words, actions [or] interactions with patients, families, peers [or] faculty.” It is simply a crude attempt by Yoder to be humorous in describing an anonymous prolonged
labor and delivery. It was written without any clearly intended audience
and posted on Yoder’s own personal MySpace page. That the Blog Post
was technically accessible to the public does not fundamentally alter the
177
nature of the writing.

The opinion also stated that if the school of nursing meant to include
the type of information contained in Yoder’s posting, then it bore a
responsibility to provide “fair notice” to her by specifying the profes178
sionalism obligations imposed on nursing students.
While not basing its decision on First Amendment grounds, the
court in this first Yoder opinion made an important distinction between a student speaking in a professional setting—such as a clinical

174
175
176
177
178

Yoder, 2012 WL 1078819, at *6 (“In sum, the Blog Post does not contain information that
could possibly lead to the discovery of the birth mother’s identity.”).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.
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rotation or formal instructional setting—and a student speaking in a
non-curricular context.
The contrasting district court opinions in Yoder demonstrate how
the emergence of online speech has left courts struggling with the
appropriate legal standards that should govern student speech and
expression that take place outside of a formal instructional setting,
but still potentially manifest some type of appropriate curricular connection for institutions to regulate the speech. In another case that
raises such concerns with online speech, Snyder v. Millersville Universi179
ty, a federal district court turned to the legal standards governing
public employee speech rights to determine the extent of a student’s
speech rights. Snyder dealt with the removal of a university student
from her student teaching placement by the cooperating school due,
180
Following her removal
in part, to online postings that she made.
from the student teaching placement, the university could not award
Stacey Snyder an education degree with teacher certification based
181
on Pennsylvania requirements for the awarding of such degrees.
She sued the university, alleging deprivation of her First and Four182
teenth Amendment rights.
As part of the preparation for her student teaching experience,
university officials provided Snyder with a guide informing her that
she was expected to adhere to the same professionalism standards as
183
Student teachers were
full-time teachers at the placement school.
warned not to “friend” students or teachers on personal Web pages,
and were informed of a past instance concerning a student teacher
184
who was dismissed from a practicum for such activity. Snyder, disregarding these admonishments, discussed her Myspace page with
185
students at the placement school on several occasions.
In one incident, Snyder confronted a student at her placement
school who had recognized and communicated with a friend of hers,
186
ostensibly as a result of viewing content on Snyder’s Myspace page.
187
She discussed this incident on her Myspace page. In this same posting, Snyder appeared to refer to a school official as the reason for not
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
Id. *5–8. The student’s removal from the placement meant that she was unable to obtain
an education degree with teacher certification.
Yoder, 2012 WL 1078819, at *2, *8.
Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
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wanting to apply for a permanent position at the placement school.188
Snyder also had a picture on her Myspace page that showed her wearing a pirate hat and holding a plastic cup with the caption “drunken
189
In part because of the content of her MySpace postings,
pirate.”
190
school officials disallowed Snyder from continuing her placement.
In analyzing Snyder’s claims, the court stated that a threshold issue involved whether she should be viewed as a student or as an em191
Influployee for purposes of her First Amendment arguments.
enced by the fact that the student did not attend any classes at the
university during the period of the placement and the professional
nature of student teaching assignments, the court determined that
192
Snyder “was more a teacher than a student.” This meant, according
to the court, that the student’s speech claims were subject to evaluation under First Amendment rules governing public employees’
193
Applying these standards, the court stated that her
speech rights.
speech would be eligible to receive protection if it had addressed a
matter of public concern, but stated that “[p]laintiff conceded at tri194
Accordingly,
al . . . that her posting raised only personal matters.”
the court rejected Snyder’s arguments that she should be eligible for
the First Amendment protections that typically attach to student
speech.
Another case raising issues similar to those at stake in Yoder and
195
As with the two district
Snyder is Tatro v. University of Minnesota.
court opinions in Yoder, the different analytical frameworks employed
196
by the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme
197
Court illustrate how courts are wrestling with the proper legal
standards to apply to student online speech. While the case involved
online speech raising both curricular concerns and the issue of
threatening speech, we focus on the curricular aspects at issue in the
litigation.
The case involved a mortuary science student, Amanda Tatro, who
made various postings on her Facebook page, such as assigning a
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *14–15.
Id. at *16.
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 509
(Minn. 2012).
Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 811.
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 509.
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nickname to a cadaver used in classroom assignments.198 She also
posted, for instance, about wanting to use a mortuary device to stab
someone in the throat, stating, “Hmm . . . perhaps I will spend the
evening updating my ‘Death List # 5’ and making friends with the
199
crematory guy. I do know the code . . . .” Upon learning about the
postings, university officials—in addition to asking the police to inves200
tigate —charged the student with (1) violating the student conduct
code by engaging in harassing or assaultive conduct and (2) violating
201
rules governing student behavior in the mortuary science program.
A hearing panel determined that the student had violated student
conduct rules as well as professionalism standards for mortuary sci202
ence students. It imposed sanctions on Tatro that included receiving a failing grade for the course and a requirement that she enroll
203
in a clinical ethics course.
In relation to the issue of professionalism standards, the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered several grounds on which the university took action against Tatro. The university concluded that Tatro
violated rules in the mortuary science student conduct code related
to “carry[ing] out all aspects of the funeral service in a competent
and respectful manner” and treating deceased persons with “proper
care and dignity during the transfer from the place of death and sub204
sequent transportation of the remains.” The court agreed with Tatro that these provisions dealt with funeral services and, thus, could
205
not be applied to her Facebook postings.
The court held that Tatro’s Facebook comments could fall under
the rule regulating conversational language related to discussion of
206
cadaver dissection. Tatro also argued that the university improperly
found that she had “violated rules outlined in her signed anatomybequest-program human-anatomy access-orientation disclosure
207
She contended that the form did not contain any list of
form.”
rules, but the court stated that the form demonstrated recognition
from Tatro that she “understood the policies and the overall responsibilities that the privilege of dissecting a human body carries with
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 814.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 814. The university police determined that no crime had been committed. Id.
Id. at 814–15.
Id. at 815.
Id.
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id. at 818–19.
Id. at 819.
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it.”208 “From the disclosure form,” discussed the court, “it is evident
that certain policies and rules regarding treating donors with respect
209
As such, the
and dignity were explained during the orientation.”
court of appeals determined that it was appropriate for the university
to reference the form in deciding that Tatro “violated the overall pol210
icy requirement of treating donors with respect and dignity.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the ruling that the university could discipline Tatro on academic grounds, but it was careful to
211
articulate limits on the extent of institutional authority in this area.
The court determined that neither Tinker/Healy nor Hazelwood provided the appropriate legal frameworks to evaluate Tatro’s speech
212
In
claims dealing with whether she violated curricular standards.
considering the academic rationale to discipline Tatro, the court
considered two justifications advanced by the university: (1) to educate students regarding applicable professionalism and ethical standards; and (2) to help maintain the viability of the anatomy bequest
213
program by ensuring the respectful treatment of donated remains.
Regarding the issue of academic authority as a basis to sanction
Tatro, the opinion referenced an amicus brief from the American
Board of Funeral Service Education. That brief stated that the program standards were consistent with the organization’s accreditation
214
The court viewed the professional standards as equivastandards.
lent to academic standards, which is a basis to grant universities deference in decision-making absent arbitrary decision-making. The
court concluded that Tatro’s social media posting did indeed violate
academic program rules pertaining to the treatment of human ca215
davers.
In relation to the Tinker/Healy standards, the court rejected Tatro’s arguments that her postings were beyond the purview of the
216
university’s academic authority. She had urged the court to accept
the position that “public university students are entitled to the same
free speech rights as members of the general public with regard to
217
Implicitly, the argument she raised contended
Facebook posts.”
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 523 (Minn. 2012).
Id. at 518–21.
Id. at 521–24.
Id. at 516–17.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 517.
Id.
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that her online postings reflected off-campus and non-curricular matters. The court acknowledged “the concerns expressed by Tatro and
supporting amici that adoption of a broad rule would allow a public
university to regulate a student’s personal expression at any time, at
218
any place, for any claimed curriculum-based reason.” Despite these
concerns, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that both parties
agreed that a university has authority to regulate speech when such
speech violates professional conduct standards. Thus, Tatro’s argument failed.
The university asserted the Hazelwood standard as the appropriate
framework, stating that the policy was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical objective. The court disagreed about this framework too. In rejecting Hazelwood as providing the appropriate standard, the court stated that the decision’s standards apply to schoolsponsored speech and “addresses the question whether the First
Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular
219
student speech.” The court stated that conceiving of Tatro’s Facebook posts as somehow school-sponsored would provide colleges with
“wide-ranging authority to constrain offensive or controversial Internet activity by requiring only that a school’s actions be ‘reasonably re220
It noted that high
lated’ to ‘legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”
school decisions had interpreted the concept of legitimate pedagogical concern broadly, permitting schools to address concerns related
221
to such issues as courtesy and respect for authority.
The court also declined to apply the substantial disruption standard from Tinker as an appropriate basis to ground the university’s academic authority over curricular issues, even as it noted that this had
been applied in other decisions dealing with online student speech,
222
As the court
including several ones involving secondary students.
noted, the Tinker opinion had stated that speech causing substantial
223
disruption could be subject to educators’ authority. But, in relation
to the university sanctioning Tatro on academic grounds, the court
pointed out that the issue was not one of disruption to the campus or
224
to the mortuary sciences program. Instead, the university took ac-

218
219
220
221
222
223
224

Id. at 521.
Id. at 518 (internal quotation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 518–21.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
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tion against Tatro based on violation of professional norms expected
225
of students in the mortuary sciences program.
Looking to several recent cases dealing with the enforcement of
professionalism standards in relation to graduate students in counse226
lor education programs, the Minnesota Supreme Court focused on
the enforcement of legitimately based professionalism standards as
an appropriate basis for institutional authority to extend to student
off-campus speech, such as that engaged in by Tatro. The court stated, “[W]e hold that a university does not violate the free speech
rights of a student enrolled in a professional program when the university imposes sanctions for Facebook posts that violate academic
program rules that are narrowly tailored and directly related to estab227
lished professional conduct standards.”
In reviewing the standards imposed on Tatro, the Minnesota Supreme Court discussed that there existed clearly established professionalism rules for those in the mortuary sciences dealing with re228
spect for human cadavers. The court then agreed that the specific
rules imposed on Tatro comported with these standards and were
229
In making this determination, the court disnarrowly tailored.
cussed the importance of showing appropriate deference to academic
decisions dealing with curricular issues:
In this case, the University is not sanctioning Tatro for a private conversation, but for Facebook posts that could be viewed by thousands of Facebook users and for sharing the Facebook posts with the news media. Accordingly, we conclude that the University’s sanctions were grounded in
230
narrowly tailored rules regulating widely disseminated Facebook posts.

The court noted that the rules applied to Tatro permitted private
231
conversational language about cadavers that was respectful.
An interesting dimension to the court’s decision involved the emphasis that it placed on the public nature of Tatro’s comments.
Thus, the court did not address the issue of a Facebook posting not
available to large number of individuals. The public/private distinction appeared to represent a dimension responding to how online
postings, especially on social media sites, can result in widespread distribution. The court failed to outline the parameters of this public/private divide. For instance, the court did not discuss the permis225
226
227
228
229
230
231

Id. at 521.
Id. at 520–21.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 523.
Id.

86

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:1

sibility of sanctions if a student sent an e-mail or made a statement,
and then another person posted these comments on a social media
site.
In the evolving area of law related to higher education students’
online speech, court decisions demonstrate varying approaches regarding the appropriate legal standards to apply. Some courts have
sought to stretch the Hazelwood standards to accommodate issues
raised by independent student speech involving potential curricular
concerns, even when the speech occurs outside of a formal instructional context. As demonstrated in Snyder, for students enrolled in
practicums and internships, the legal standards derived from the
public employee speech cases have emerged as another option to define students’ speech rights, one giving far-reaching authority to institutional officials over student speech in such settings. In contrast,
when faced with circumstances not completely distinct from those at
issue in Snyder, the two district court opinions in the Yoder case represent additional legal paths to dealing with independent student
speech raising curricular concerns. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision in Tatro represents yet another approach, one mindful of investing colleges with too much control over independent student
speech.
Wading into this muddled situation, this Article now considers the
issue of what legal standards courts should adopt when balancing legitimate institutional interests related to academic matters with the
accompanying need to enforce rules suitable for higher education
environments rather than ones predominately grounded in concerns
at the elementary and secondary education levels.
IV. CONSTRUCTING THE CURRICULAR NEXUS TEST
In Part III, the focus was to further delineate the concept of
speech taking place within or implicating the collegiate learning
space. Now, in Part IV, the discussion shifts to presenting the Curricular Nexus Test. Cases involving higher education students’ online
speech help reveal the legal overreach that occurs as a result of
wholesale application to higher education of legal standards developed in cases dealing with elementary and secondary students. Further, the need exists to refine the legal rules governing independent
student speech in instructional settings or taking place outside of a
formal class context but potentially implicating curricular concerns.
Tackling these issues, Subpart A first considers independent student
speech taking place in a curricular context and then turns to speech
taking place outside of a formal instructional environment, but po-
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tentially raising legitimate curricular considerations. Subpart B examines independent speech that takes place outside of the formal instructional setting but has a capacity to reach curricular concerns.
A. Independent Student Speech in an Instructional Setting
In relation to independent student speech taking place in a formal class context, the legitimate pedagogical standards from Hazel232
wood are not wholly unsuitable to apply to college student speech.
The important caveat that courts must recognize with these standards, however, relates to the need to clarify the concept of legitimate
curricular or pedagogical interest in a higher education environment. While at times giving perfunctory acknowledgement to the
233
need to tailor these standards to college student speech, courts in
fact often fail to clarify the specific types of criteria that they should
take into account regarding the concept of legitimate pedagogical
234
concerns justifying speech restrictions on college students.
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court put substantial emphasis on the
fact that school officials had acted to protect younger students from
exposure to certain views or information for which they might not be
235
prepared to engage. In contrast, the collegiate experience, rather
than sheltering students from ideas or views from which they might
not yet be mature enough to encounter, is focused on challenging
students intellectually, including in relation to examining their own
values and beliefs. Instead of seeking to shelter students from certain
types of views or beliefs, colleges and universities fulfill a special niche
236
Accordingly, the concept of pedain the “marketplace of ideas.”
gogical concern announced in Hazelwood should be adjusted to account for the Court’s declarations that colleges and universities are
meant to be places of open inquiry and the exchange of ideas. In essence, the Hazelwood standards need to grow up if they are to consti237
tute legal rules sensible to apply in higher education.
232
233
234
235
236
237

See discussions supra Parts II.B and III.B.
See discussion supra Part II.B, particularly with regard to the Heenan case.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–72 (1988).
See discussions supra Parts I.C and II.B.
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995) (articulating that the “quality and creative power of student intellectual life to this day remains a
vital measure of a school’s influence and attainment” so courts should be weary of administrative actions of “suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and university campuses”); Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (“The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly ‘the marketplace of ideas.’”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of
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The application of tort standards to the collegiate environment
provides a good example of how courts have readily adopted the view
238
Similarly, as
that college students should be considered as adults.
discussed in Part I, courts have restricted institutional authority to
regulate student speech in the co-curricular realm, even for speech
that is offensive to members of the campus community. Yet, courts
have too often balked at the need to acknowledge that higher education student speech in instructional settings also needs to be differentiated from elementary or secondary student speech. The suggestion
that colleges have authority to restrict speech in a manner that signals
high degrees of control in the learning process reflects an antithetical
viewpoint about the individual development and responsibility of
239
adulthood.
Understandably, some of the resistance by courts to question faculty authority over independent student speech arising in a curricular
context stems from the judicial deference to academic decisions es240
241
tablished in cases such as Ewing and Horowitz. In fact, some opinions have even indicated that academic freedom concerns potentially
should permit greater control of college students’ speech in instruc242
tional contexts than of elementary and secondary students’ speech;
but these opinions have failed to explain under what conditions spe243
cifically such circumstances arise. The issue of faculty authority to
enforce curricular standards and evaluate student competency at issue in cases such as Ewing and Horowitz should not be haphazardly
comingled with the standards from Hazelwood. The fact that independent student speech has occurred in an instructional context or
otherwise touched on curricular or pedagogical issues should not
subject such college student speech in a perfunctory fashion to un-

238

239

240
241
242
243

N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (recognizing academic freedom as a First Amendment interest because the “Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas” that occurs in higher education); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (valuing the role of colleges
as an atmosphere of “speculation, experiment and creation,” which is “essential to the
quality of higher education”).
Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979) (“College students today are no
longer minors; they are now regarded as adults in almost every phase of community
life.”).
Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Are College Students Adults? Their Conceptions of the Transition to Adulthood, 1 J. ADULT DEV. 213 (1994) (finding that a majority of college students expressed
signs of adulthood through recognition of independence and responsibility).
Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
See discussion supra Part I.C.
See discussion supra Part I.C.
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warranted institutional control. Instead, courts need to discern the
dimensions of the word “legitimate” when referring to a legitimate
curricular pedagogical interest. That interpretation must fit the context of higher education as opposed to what could pass for a legitimate pedagogical or curricular interest in an elementary or secondary education context.
As active participants in the marketplace of ideas, college students
are not supposed to behave merely as passive recipients of ideas and
244
They may advocate for positions, raise questions, and
knowledge.
challenge the views and positions of others, including faculty. While
compelling grounds exist that a student should not enjoy free rein to
disrupt a course, to interfere with the learning of other students, or
to ignore curricular requirements developed pursuant to the exercise
245
of faculty expertise, the Hazelwood standards should not serve as a
basis to limit higher education students’ right to participate in the intellectual life of the academy, including in relation to voicing critiques and concerns about academic offerings. Accordingly, courts
should pay attention to ensure that restriction of a student’s independent speech in a curricular context is backed by curricular or
pedagogical reasons suitable for adults.
Notably, absent creating a disruption or failing to satisfy curricular
requirements, a student’s disagreement in class with curricular, grading, or professionalism standards should not suffice to trigger a Hazelwood level of faculty control over the speech or expression. In Heenan v. Rhoades, discussed in Part II, the court clearly struggled with
this important limitation on Hazelwood in a higher education setting.
The court discussed the pedagogical need for students to accept and
246
address their own academic shortcomings, but it failed to sufficiently explain how mere disagreement with an instructor over the evaluation of a student’s work or with curricular standards should serve as a
basis to invoke the Hazelwood standards. Giving such unfettered authority to institutions over student speech conflicts with the concept
of college students as adult members of an intellectual community
and also runs contrary to student First Amendment cases in other settings, such as those involving institutionally created forums for stu247
dent speech.
244

245
246
247

PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 16, 72 (2006) (arguing that education
should not operate off of a “banking model” in which students learn from deposits of information without fully questioning and engaging in the lessons).
See generally discussion supra Part I.
Heenan v. Rhodes, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1321 (M.D. Ala. 2011).
See discussion supra Part II.A.
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In considering independent student speech taking place in the
curricular context of practicums and internships, the Snyder v. Millersville University decision represents an even more problematic ap248
In Snyder, the
proach than looking to the Hazelwood standards.
court relied on the public employee speech standards as a basis to
deny a student an education degree and accompanying state teaching
249
Under these standards, a public employee engaging
certification.
in speech pursuant to carrying out official employment duties may
not look to the First Amendment to protect such speech or expres250
Speech not made pursuant to carrying out official employsion.
ment duties may be eligible for First Amendment protection if it ad251
dressing a matter of public concern.
The public employee standards, developed as a result of the need
to permit public employers adequate control over the workplace en252
vironment, are far removed from the types of considerations at issue in regards to faculty authority over curricular matters. Thus, in
Snyder, the court conflated the speech standards applicable to public
school teachers in regards to their employers with the legal standards
an academic program should follow in relation to student speech
253
rights. Adoption of such a position permits institutions a degree of
control over student speech far removed from that permitted in any
of the other student speech cases, one not requiring even the establishment of a minimal curricular or pedagogical reason, even in instances where a student could be denied a degree. While a college or
university may not be able to force a placement partner to allow a
student to continue with an internship or practicum, the institution
should still have to establish that legitimate curricular grounds exist
to sanction the student or to disallow the granting of a degree.
The actions of the court in Snyder represent another variation of
courts failing to tailor speech standards in a way that is appropriate to
254
In this instance, rather than
a higher education environment.
treating college students in a manner more appropriate for elementary or secondary students, the Snyder court adopted a stance that
confused their status and speech interests with that of full-time public
employees. In equating an internship or practicum to the experienc-

248
249
250
251
252
253
254

Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
Id. at *10.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *14–15.
Id. at *10.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
Hutchens, supra note 76.
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es of full-time employment, the court gave remarkable legal discretion to an institution not merely to dismiss a student from an employment situation, but also to deny the individual a degree. That is,
failing to consider the unique circumstances at stake in relation to
the student’s educational pursuits, the court in Snyder articulated a
position giving institutions almost unbridled control over student
speech arising as part of fulfilling internship or practicum requirements. A student’s participation in a practicum or internship should
not serve as a sufficient basis to restrict college students’ curricular
speech under the First Amendment via the public employee speech
standards.
Instead, when evaluating student speech in a formal instructional
setting, including in a practicum or internship, courts should require
that institutions demonstrate their curricular or pedagogical rationales in a manner that justifies the regulation in relation to the unique
characteristics of higher education. This rule, of course, contains exceptions such as true threats, defamation, incitement, obscenity, and
actual disruption to the class environment that interferes with the
learning of other students or a faculty member’s ability to teach (e.g.,
interrupting the instructor or other students). Further, speech that
demonstrates a failure to comply with curricular requirements presumptively fails to meet protections in the curricular setting. As a
general matter, college students’ independent in-class speech should
merit meaningful First Amendment protection. Accordingly, courts
should be careful to ensure that institutions are not seeking to play
the pedagogical card as a means to sanction student speech that runs
counter to the views or opinions of faculty or institutional officials.
B. Independent Student Speech Outside an Instructional Setting but
Potentially Implicating Curricular Concerns
In relation to independent student speech taking place outside a
formal instructional setting, curricular concerns can and do exist,
such as the enforcement of professionalism standards, where institutional authority should extend to the speech based on academic
grounds. Outside such limited instances, institutions should be presumptively prohibited from sanctioning independent student speech
based on academic grounds.
As the Minnesota Supreme Court articulated in Tatro, neither the
Tinker/Healy nor Hazelwood standards are often appropriate to apply
to independent student speech generally taking place outside of a
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formal course environment but raising curricular concerns, such as
255
professionalism standards. As the decision pointed out, cases such
as Tinker (and Morse v. Frederick) discuss standards that deal with the
256
disruption of the elementary or secondary school environment.
Applying the kind of disruption standard on academic grounds articulated in those decisions to a college setting makes little sense and
fails to comport with judicial treatment of higher education student
speech in other contexts.
For instance, especially in legal decisions involving student forums, courts have demonstrated an unwillingness to permit colleges
to prohibit independent student speech simply on the basis that
members of the campus community may disagree vehemently with its
257
Thus, courts
contents or find the speech unsettling or offensive.
have disallowed institutions from banning anti-abortion speakers on
258
campus from displaying graphic images and barring students from
wearing empty firearm holsters on campus as a means to promote
259
open carry laws. As pointed out by the Minnesota Supreme Court
in Tatro, relying on the Tinker substantial disruption standards to regulate independent, out-of-class speech based on academic concerns
represents an ill-advised approach, one threatening to provide institutional officials with too much discretion to restrict student
260
speech.
As the Tatro decision also pointed out, Hazelwood provides an inappropriate set of legal standards to apply to independent student
speech arising outside of a formal course setting. The opinion noted
correctly that permitting a college or university to regulate such
speech only on the basis of pedagogical concerns absent a sufficient
255
256
257

258

259

260

See discussion supra Part III.B.
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Minn. 2012).
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 230, 235 (2000) (acknowledging constitutional problems with a policy allowing student referenda as an acceptable means to fund or defund a program). In Southworth, the Court indicated that to
“the extent the referendum substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality it
would undermine the constitutional protection the program requires.” Id. at 235. The
Court explained that the “whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are
treated with the same respect as are majority views. Access to a public forum, for instance, does not depend upon majoritarian consent.” Id.
ASU Students for Life v. Crow, No.CV 06-1824-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 686946 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 10, 2008), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 357 F. App’x. 156 (9th Cir. 2009); Pro-Life
Cougars v. Univ. of Hous., 259 F. Supp. 2d 5 (S.D. Tex. 2003), appeal dismissed, 67 F.
App’x. 251 (5th Cir. 2003).
Smith v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 2d 610 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (finding a policy
that barred students from wearing empty holsters in the classroom and hallways to be unconstitutional).
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 519–20.
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and legitimate curricular rationale results in giving colleges too much
legal leeway over independent student speech taking place outside of
an instructional setting. The Minnesota Supreme Court, while not
completely defining its standard, demonstrated a sounder approach
in limiting the regulation of out-of-class, independent student speech
on legitimate professionalism grounds, with such standards derived
261
from accepted professional practices and rules.
We argue that regulation of independent student speech outside
of a class setting should require an appropriate curricular nexus (i.e., an
underlying logic or rationale fitting for higher education students
versus elementary or secondary ones) before a school can take action
against a student on academic grounds. As in Tatro, legitimate professionalism standards could suffice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, even though invoking Hazelwood, essentially followed this type of standard in a recent decision, Keeton v. Anderson262
Wiley, when it permitted a counselor education program to take action against a graduate student who expressed an intention, including through her out-of-class speech, to violate applicable professional263
ism standards of the counseling profession. Even though some of
the student’s comments occurred outside of class, the court permitted the program to take action, as the student had evinced a clear intent not to uphold standards of the counseling profession in dealing
264
with clients.
A standard that permits a program to take action on academic
grounds for out-of-class student speech with an appropriate curricular nexus, such as legitimate and documented professionalism standards, provides a way to balance legitimate institutional concerns related to curricular authority with important interests related to
safeguarding students’ First Amendment rights. As an example, a law
student might sign a pledge not to discuss questions on an exam that
another class section is scheduled to take at a later date. If the student then goes on Facebook and posts information about the exam
that runs afoul of the pledge, such as discussing information regarding specific questions, then disciplinary action might well be appropriate. At the same time, and as addressed in Tatro, students should
265
not simply be able to “sign away” their constitutional rights. Thus,
if the pledge for the exam had stated that students could not men261
262
263
264
265

See discussion supra Part III.B.
664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 876.
Id. at 877.
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521 n.6.
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tion the exam at all or be critical of the quality of the exam, and the
student then wrote about the terrible quality of the questions in a
general sense without providing any specifics, then the institution
should face a much more difficult task in trying to establish some
type of appropriate curricular nexus to take action against the student for such speech.
In looking for support for the appropriate curricular nexus test,
the cases dealing with showing appropriate judicial deference to academic decision-making and noting the importance of safeguarding
academic freedom provide a rationale for institutional authority distinctive from cases involving elementary and secondary students. Rather than suggesting that colleges should possess unfettered discretion, as the Tatro court stated, institutional authority in this area
should be circumscribed. The exercise of curricular authority should
align with the mission and purpose of higher education rather than
be allowed to rest on some kind of vague invocation of educator authority that is overly reliant on standards appropriate for elementary
266
and secondary students.
In relation to professionalism standards and the idea of an appropriate curricular nexus, this standard could also be applied in relation to practicums and internships. In Snyder, much of the student’s
expression at issue took place outside of the student teaching placement. Students in practicums and internships should be viewed as
students for purposes of their relationship with a university in terms
267
of their ability to remain enrolled in an academic program. While a
school might not be able to prevent a student from being expelled
from an internship or placement, an institution should not be able to
deny a student a degree by latching onto the standards of the public
268
Accordingly, a
employee speech cases, namely Garcetti v. Ceballos.
266
267
268

Id. at 518.
Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3,
2008).
547 U.S. 410, 411 (2006) (“So long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of
public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their
employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”). In Snyder, for instance, the application
of professionalism standards could well have served as a basis to deny the student an education degree. But what about the student who alleges that she is removed for a studentteaching practicum for complaining about irregularities in the administration of student
achievement exams? Even if a teacher’s speech in such circumstances might fail to garner First Amendment protection under the Garcetti standards, should a student be denied
a degree because she was fulfilling the duties of a teacher? Common sense would seem to
dictate that this is not a rational reason to deny a degree, and such speech should be eligible for First Amendment protection in relation to the student being able to obtain a
degree.
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school should not be able to argue that a student raised only issues of
private as opposed to public concern as a basis to deny a student First
Amendment protection for independent student speech made outside of a formal instructional setting, but somehow connected to pro269
fessionalism standards involving a practicum or internship.
CONCLUSION
Cases involving college students’ online speech demonstrate the
limits of applying, to those in higher education, legal standards derived from cases dealing with elementary and secondary students. In
addition, an emphasis on physical location to determine college students’ speech rights often has run into limitations when courts were
faced with online space. This Article suggests a Curricular Nexus
Test as a means to construct a workable legal framework to address
college students’ online speech that impacts the curricular environment. Specifically, we argue for an emphasis on an appropriate curricular nexus that corrects over-reliance by courts on the K–12 student speech cases in constructing First Amendment standards
applicable to college students. Reliance on an appropriate curricular
nexus standard permits institutional regulation of independent student speech occurring not only in formal instructional contexts, but
also outside of formal instructional settings in limited circumstances,
such as when legitimate and established professionalism standards
are at stake. As with our criticism of over-reliance on legal standards
more appropriate for K–12 students, we also argue against applying
legal standards from the public employee speech cases to students
enrolled in practicums and internships.
The Curricular Nexus Test indicates that independent student
speech taking place in a formal class context operates by default with
the legitimate pedagogical standards from Hazelwood. As such, our
test is more evolutionary than revolutionary for student online speech
taking place in a class or instructional setting. Yet, to create a functional analysis of what constitutes curricular speech, the Curricular
Nexus Test elaborates on the dimensions to clarify the concept of legitimate pedagogical interest in regards to higher education environments. Specifically, the determination of a legitimate pedagogical
or curricular interest should be adjusted to account for the Court’s
declarations that colleges and universities are meant to be places of
open inquiry and the exchange of ideas. Thus, an appropriate cur269

Id. at 414–16.
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ricular nexus is viewed in terms of (a) students as adults, which includes the maturity of the students relative to other educational settings (e.g., middle and high school); (b) the educational setting, such as
classrooms (in-person or online), practicums, and internships; (c) the
educational environment, which fosters an exchange of ideas (i.e., not a
banking model consisting of deposited information); and, (d) the degree of intentionality as a careful and deliberate process involving sound
professional judgment—not perfunctory explanations or stretched
conceptions of the educational purpose.
Under the Curricular Nexus Test, a college student’s online
speech that demonstrates a failure to comply with curricular requirements presumptively fails to meet protections in the curricular
setting. Further, this test recognizes already-established exceptions to
the boundaries of student speech rights such as true threats, defamation, incitement, obscenity, and actual disruption to the class environment that interferes with the learning of other students or a faculty member’s ability to teach. Finally, the Curricular Nexus Test
indicates that student speech outside of limited, defined instances is
presumptively prohibited from campus sanctioning of independent
student speech found within or implicating the curricular learning
space.
In sum, in certain circumstances, extending institutional academic
authority to independent student speech occurring in or out of a
formal learning space is warranted, such as the enforcement of accepted professionalism or ethical rules. But, when independent student speech fails to trigger actual curricular or pedagogical concerns
appropriate for a higher education environment, courts should operate with a presumption that institutions be prohibited on purely academic grounds from sanctioning such independent student speech.

